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ABSTRACT 
Poland’s transition from totalitarianism to democracy began in the late 1970s and 
brought the staged end of the communist system by 1989. The strikes by Polish workers 
in 1976 against increasing food prices, backed by a dissident intelligentsia, sparked a 
chain of events that, barely thirteen years later, led to the first non-communist 
government in Poland in over forty years. Although this change of political system was 
conducted in a peaceful manner, there has always been a camp who has posed the 
question of why Polish democracy had to be based on compromise with the old regime, 
and whether compromise was really the only possible solution. After eighteen years, 
Poland still faces issues of lustration and decommunization that were avoided in 1989, 
when secret police agents and collaborators were allowed to remain on the political scene 
and influence many aspects of life in Poland.  
This thesis examines how Poland’s peaceful revolution happened as it did and 
discusses how to handle collaborators with the communist regime. It also probes the new 
debate about decommunization and lustration, launched after the election of 2005, which 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Poland’s transition from totalitarianism to democracy began in the late 1970s and 
brought the staged end of the communist system by 1989. The strikes by Polish workers 
in 1976 against increasing food prices, backed by a dissident intelligentsia, sparked a 
chain of events that, barely thirteen years later, led to the first non-communist 
government in Poland in over forty years. Deteriorating economic conditions, the 
continuing problems of economic reform, persistent strong opposition even after the 
military coup of General Wojciech Jaruzelski in 1981, and the continuing weakness of 
the ruling regime all turned out to be steps towards the final collapse of communism in 
1989. The final stage involved negotiations between the government and the opposition 
known as the Roundtable Talks, which led to a partially free parliamentary election and 
restored the upper chamber of parliament and presidency. The communist government 
did not expect the staggering electoral defeat it experienced in June 1989, and shortly 
afterwards the communists lost power. Although this change of political system was 
conducted in a peaceful manner, there has always been a camp who has posed the 
question of why Polish democracy had to be based on compromise with the old regime, 
and whether compromise was really the only possible solution. After eighteen years, 
Poland still faces issues of lustration and decommunization that were avoided in 1989, 
when secret police agents and collaborators were allowed to remain on the political scene 
and influence many aspects of life in Poland.  
These questions came back in force with the elections of 2005, when the 
vehemently anti-communist Peace and Justice Party, set up and led by former Solidarity 
activist Jaroslaw Kaczynski, won and formed a new government. Jaroslaw’s twin brother, 
Lech, later won the presidential election, after which the winners launched a new debate 
about decommunization and lustration. Both these processes are considered by the 
Kaczynskis to be vital to the future of Poland, who envision the creation of a fourth 




condemned and excluded from political and economic life. A big debate now centers on 
how to view and treat people who collaborated with the communists and how to open and 
verify secret police archives. 
This thesis will examine Poland’s continuing struggle to change from communism 
to democracy since the 1970s. It will analyze this democratic transition as it concerns the 
past’s burden on the present, as part of a broader, European-wide coming to grips with 
the late 20th and early 21st centuries. This work will consider the stages by which the 
communist system ended in central Europe and the importance of the same in 
contemporary Polish debate about who lost and who won in the transition to democracy.   
We seek to determine why Polish democracy has, in its metamorphosis out of the 
ruins of Soviete totalitarianism, embraced a kind of compromise with its opponents rather 
than opt for the purging common to post-revolutionary regimes. This question, important 
in its own right as an issue in comparative history, is highly germane to contemporary 
Polish politics, because the former government in Warsaw emphasized a draconian 
coming to grips with the past as an imperative of national policy. This thesis will attempt 
to explain the endurance of major figures, institutions, and practices from the communist 
past, and whether such continuity with the old regime has been good or bad in the long 
run. Finally, this work will consider how the decommunization and lustration have 
progressed after 1989, how to deal with the social, political, and institutional 
consequences that can be anticipated if secret police files are opened, and how Poland 
compares with Germany and Czechoslovakia, where the matter of dealing with the past 
was faced and resolved. 
 Chapter II of this thesis covers Poland’s road to democracy from 1976 to 1989 
and her struggle against the communist regime, emphasizing the importance of KOR and 
Solidarity as well as the strikes of 1980 and imposition of martial law in 1981. It 
discusses the end of the communist regime in Poland and the Roundtable Talks as the 
final and decisive factor in overthrowing communism in Poland and restoring democracy. 
Chapter III examines current controversies over Poland’s 1989 transition and the heritage 
of communism, including lustration and decommunization after 1989 and issues in the 
parliamentary election of 2005. Chapter IV studies post-Nazi Germany and post-
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communist Czechoslovakia as countries that had to deal with their past, and cites 
similarities to and differences from the Polish case. Chapter V summarizes the previous 
chapters and gives a perspective on the reasonableness of Poland’s style of regime change 




























II. POLAND'S ROAD TO DEMOCRACY FROM 1976 TO 1989 
A. POLAND’S STRUGGLE AGAINST THE COMMUNIST REGIME: 1956, 
1970, AND 1976 
Political dissent in Poland has its roots in the aftermath of World War II, which 
ended in victory for Poland’s allies, but, paradoxically, defeat for Poland itself. After her 
liberation by the Red Army from German occupation, Poland was swept into the Soviet 
sphere as a satellite state, with Soviet forces remaining on Polish territory.1 Communism, 
unpopular in Poland before the war, now came to power, driven by fiat of a foreign state. 
Poland’s loss of independence, despite the defeat of Germany, and the imposition of a 
political, social, and economic system alien to her tradition became the roots of dissent in 
post-war Poland.2 
The first noteworthy broad protest against Communist rule began in Poznan in 
late June 1956, three years after the death of Stalin had encouraged liberalization in 
various parts of the Soviet empire. The Polish people had been too intimidated under 
Stalin to voice their discontent; his death, added to the increasingly open dissatisfaction 
of industrial workers with their deteriorating standard of living, emboldened the people 
and finally took them to the streets of Poznan.3  
The proximate cause of the Poznan uprising—a massive demonstration by 
workers that erupted into a street battle with many casualties—was a broken agreement 
between a workers’ delegation from “Stalin’s Factory” and the minister of machine 
industry.4 The agreement concerned compensation for smaller take-home pay brought on 
by revised production norms.5 What began with an expression of hardship soon became a 
                                                 
1 Robert Zuzowski, Political dissent and opposition in Poland: the Workers’ Defense Committee 
“KOR” (Praeger, Westport, Connecticut, 1992), 18. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid., 24. 
4 Jadwiga Staniszkis, Poland’s self-limiting revolution, ed. Jan T. Gross (Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, New Jersey, 1984), 288. 
5 Nicholas G. Andrews, Poland 1980-81. Solidarity versus the Party (National Defense University 
Press, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC, 1985), 14. 
 6
political manifestation. Workers attacked the police and local party headquarters and 
freed almost three-hundred prisoners. Seizing munitions from the police arsenal, workers 
battled police in the streets, rallying under the banner “freedom and bread.”6 The regime 
sent in troops backed formidably by tanks to crush the revolt. Regular battle was 
enjoined, with barricades, bottles of gasoline, and a few aeroplanes standing against the 
combined force of the police and army. In this gross overmatch, nearly two hundred were 
killed, including soldiers and policemen, and hundreds wounded. Several hundred 
workers were arrested and sentenced to one, five, or six years of prison. (Note that these 
figures are not accepted as reliable; the exact toll will probably never be made known.7) 
The regime had shown for the first time that it was willing to use forcible 
measures against threats to the political order, and the Soviet Union learned that the Poles 
could handle attempted revolutions without Soviet backup (as was required in Hungary). 
Unfortunately, June 1956, was not the last time the communist government used military 
might to secure their rule. 
On Sunday, December 13, 1970, eleven days before Christmas, the government, 
seeming to forget the events of June 1956—and despite the fact that almost half a 
worker’s income was going to food—announced new, higher prices8 for food and 
consumer goods, risen by an average of 17% for meat, 34% for lard, 33% for fish and 
37% for jams and marmalade. Alongside the price increases were price cuts for luxury 
items that workers had no hope of acquiring. Humiliated, angry, and desperate,9 workers, 
particularly in the north, started expressing their anger in the streets. In Gdansk and 
Szczecin, thousands of shipyard workers attacked and set fire to regional party and police 
headquarters and official trade-union buildings. The military and police were authorized 
                                                 
6 Robert Zuzowski, Political dissent and opposition in Poland: the Workers’ Defense Committee 
“KOR” (Praeger, Westport, Connecticut, 1992), 24. 
7 Jadwiga Staniszkis, Poland’s self-limiting revolution, ed. Jan T. Gross (Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, New Jersey, 1984), 289. 
8 Nicholas G. Andrews, Poland 1980-81. Solidarity versus the Party (National Defense University 
Press, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC, 1985), 15. 
9 Roman Laba, The Roots of Solidarity. A Political sociology of Poland’s working-class 
democratization (Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1991), 19. 
 7
to use weapons in response.10 Within a few days, strikes and protests fanned through 
most of the country, but only on the Baltic shore were they brutally heeled by armed 
police and Polish soldiers. The casualties were significant. In Gdansk, Gdynia, Szczecin, 
and other towns, official sources claimed forty-five dead and more than 1100 wounded. 
But the real count was likely much, much higher.11  
These events did not bring prices down; instead, the regime changed party and 
country leadership as a sop to dissatisfied workers.12 Once again, the apparat showed 
contempt for the working class and an unshakable belief that power can be maintained 
forever through force. December 1970 should have warned the communists, however, 
that “the giant which the socialist regime had itself created, the new working class”13 was 
also the new “force,” and its power should not have been underestimated. This brave 
tragedy strengthened and united the people in a common purpose. Though the 
government attempted to suppress the memory of December 1970, it became one of the 
best remembered, most widely commemorated symbols of resistance to the totalitarians.  
The high price of basic foodstuffs, meanwhile, meant ongoing hardship. Prices for 
most items remained frozen because of the government’s fear of popular reprisal. 
Nevertheless, in a central, planned economy, price freezes could only bring absurd 
disproportion between the prices of food and industrial articles, and between the cost of 
production and price to the consumer. The government could do nothing to stop the 
process by which disproportionate prices undermine economic growth. While the 
increase in prices in 1970 was appropriate from an economical point of view, the manner 
in which it was done and the nature and scope of the hikes infuriated citizens, especially 
workers.14  
                                                 
10 A. Kemp-Welch, The Birth of Solidarity (St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1983), 9. 
11 Robert Zuzowski, Political dissent and opposition in Poland: the Workers’ Defense Committee 
“KOR” (Praeger, Westport, Connecticut, 1992), 45. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Timothy Garton Ash, The Polish Revolution: Solidarity (Vintage Books. A Division of Random 
House, New York, 1985), 12. 
14 Jan Jozef Lipski, KOR: A History of the Worker’s Defense Committee in Poland, 1976-1981 
(University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, California, 1985), 31. 
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Nor did new leadership that was installed to appease the workers take any lessons 
from its predecessors.  
On June 24, 1976, authorities again drastically raised food prices, by 60% for 
meat and up to 100% for sugar, with purchase limits for fear of speculation.15 The 
reaction of the Polish worker was immediate. Huge street demonstrations and strikes 
were called. In Ursus, on the outskirts of Warsaw, workers stopped international trains; in 
Radom, they seized party headquarters and, ignored by officials, set it afire. Strikes shut 
down Baltic shipyards, the huge textiles center of Lodz, and the industrial town of Plock. 
Up to 75% of the largest Polish factories are estimated to have closed.16 To stop the 
rising tide of strikes, the state withdrew the price increases—but also called out force 
against the workers. Most savagely, they smashed protests in Radom and Ursus, where 
several workers were killed and hundreds wounded or arrested.17 The retributions 
suffered by striking workers were immense. Probably twenty thousand were fired. 
Approximately 2,500 citizens were arrested, of whom almost four hundred were found 
guilty, some receiving sentences as severe as ten years’ imprisonment.18 Others were 
forced to run a gauntlet of truncheon-wielding police, who called this, with delicate irony, 
the “path of health.”19 For the working class, job loss or imprisonment led inexorably to 
destitution. 
The people once again felt the disrespect of the state, which, regardless of 
consequences, had taken economic action without the consent of those most affected. 
Worse, they used brutality to secure their interests and power. This time, however, 
persecuted and condemned workers were not without help. Members of the Polish 
                                                 
15 Nicholas G. Andrews, Poland 1980-81. Solidarity versus the Party (National Defense University 
Press, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC, 1985), 18. 
16 Robert Zuzowski, Political dissent and opposition in Poland: the Workers’ Defense Committee 
“KOR” (Praeger, Westport, Connecticut, 1992), 60. 
17 Nicholas G. Andrews, Poland 1980-81. Solidarity versus the Party (National Defense University 
Press, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC, 1985), 18. 
18 Jan Jozef Lipski, KOR: A History of the Worker’s Defense Committee in Poland, 1976-1981 
(University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, California, 1985),  42. 
19 Robert Zuzowski, Political dissent and opposition in Poland: the Workers’ Defense Committee 
“KOR” (Praeger, Westport, Connecticut, 1992), 61. 
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intelligentsia created an organization in their defense: the first post–war, open organ of 
dissent, which they named the KOR, or “Workers’ Defense Committee” (Komitet Obrony 
Robotnikow). 
B.  THE WORKERS’ DEFENSE COMMITTEE AND THE STRIKES OF 1980 
1. The Worker’s Defense Committee 
Before June 1976, there were few dissident organizations in Poland. Dissent 
usually took violent, spontaneous, and covert forms, like dissidence in other communist 
countries, where such behavior, if any, was underground and disorganized—or if it was 
organized, it was never open; and was as a result ineffective. In Poland, organized dissent 
was kept tightly secret, and dissenting organizations had fallen from public 
consciousness.20  
The formation of the KOR was spurred by the events of June 1976, especially 
those in Radom and Ursus. Unlike 1970, members of the Polish intelligentsia rose to help 
and defend persecuted workers. The first support came as legal aid, supplied by Catholic 
charities and the dissidents themselves,21 administered first in Warsaw, then Radom, and 
gathered from throughout Poland.  The state’s reaction was iron fisted. Dissidents were 
harassed by two-day arrests, house searches, beatings, and surveillance. Nevertheless, 
few were permanently discouraged. Rather, they conceived of creating an organization, 
independent of the state, specially for the defense of the worker. The result was the first 
openly functioning dissident organization in communist Poland.22 
The KOR worker’s defense committee was inaugurated on September 23, 1976 to 
respond to the increased harassment of the growing ranks of militant industrial workers 
and to bring relief to the victims of June 1976. In its first official statement, KOR 
declared its objective as “legal, financial, and medical help to the victims of 
                                                 
20 Robert Zuzowski, Political dissent and opposition in Poland: the Workers’ Defense Committee 
“KOR” (Praeger, Westport, Connecticut, 1992), 51. 
21 Ibid., 62. 
22 Ibid., 63. 
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repression.”23 They also demanded amnesty for arrested workers, the rehiring of 
dismissed strikers, and the punishment of those guilty of abuse towards workers, 
including criminal acts, torture, and beatings. Because persecuted workers could not 
count on institutional help, the KOR declared it the task of Polish society to provide for 
their defense through solidarity and aid.24  
Furthermore, KOR’s founders articulated a set of postulates according to which 
political aims could be achieved in communist Poland. They were convinced that in 
contemporary Poland, open opposition alone made sense, because only by bold example 
would others join the opposition. They believed that until Poles overcame their fear of 
recrimination for political activity, moving from communism to democracy would be 
impossible.25 One of the best-known founders of KOR, Jacek Kuron, held that all 
political reforms must be peaceable, because this was only possible means of regime 
change in the circumstances. People had to awaken to their own potential to order their 
lives, secure civil rights, access information, and enjoy better living and greater religious 
freedom. Under pressure from a society the state would be forced to talk politics.  
Kuron’s close friend Adam Michnik, also a leading figure in Polish 
anticommunism, supported gradual reform over a relatively long time through peaceful 
means. He claimed that revolution was unrealistic and dangerous if change was not also 
happening in the Soviet Union,26 citing the Czechoslovakian example of 1968, when the 
possibility of reform was stubbed out by Warsaw Pact forces led by the Red Army. “The 
way of struggling for reforms—the evolutionary way—is the only way… .”27  
Although KOR founders agreed generally on how to engage the regime, two 
factions emerged, differing mainly on ideology, the strategic range of open opposition, 
and the pacing of reform activities. Some KOR founders opposed the social-democratic 
                                                 
23 Robert Zuzowski, Political dissent and opposition in Poland: the Workers’ Defense Committee 
“KOR” (Praeger, Westport, Connecticut, 1992), 65. 
24 Ibid., 66. 
25 Ibid., 69. 
26 Ibid., 72. 
27 Ibid. 
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views of Kuron and Michnik, emphasizing instead their liberal-right roots. These 
differences divided the KOR in 1977 and reemerged in independent Poland after 1989, 
when supporters of the liberal-right faction were highly critical of the KOR’s legacy and 
opposition agreements with communists (known as the Roundtable Accords). 
By the end of 1976, the KOR was firmly rooted in Polish politics, having survived 
its risky formation and avoided arrests and major repression. The best explanation for this 
accomplishment is that the regime simply underestimated the KOR’s potential influence 
on Polish society. Nor did the government want to be seen as persecuting the KOR, 
because this organization for the workers’ protection had enormous support among them. 
Hostility towards the KOR would only anger Poland’s workers and send them back to the 
streets, a prospect the regime did not relish after so short a time.28 
What arose spontaneously in June 1976 as an organization offering various helps 
to persecuted workers became a group that, more than any other entity, changed the 
conduct of opposition in communist-ruled Poland. The KOR gradually transformed 
dissent from hidden and spontaneous to open and organized. To the KOR alone goes 
credit for bridging the social chasm between workers and the intelligentsia imposed by 
communist ideology and the state’s monopoly on information. The KOR united a 
tremendous number of workers and intellectuals in new hope of overthrowing 
communism.29   
2. The Strikes of 1980 
At the beginning of 1980, some party members were urging economic reforms in 
the face of drastically worsening conditions. In April 1980, the government announced 
essential reforms in planning methods, economic management, and state administration.  
 
 
                                                 
28 Robert Zuzowski, Political dissent and opposition in Poland: the Workers’ Defense Committee 
“KOR” (Praeger, Westport, Connecticut, 1992), 76. 
29 Ibid., 110. 
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The need to raise food prices gradually over several years was also mentioned.30 
However, this time, the regime did not intend to provide notification of price hikes, 
believing they might go unnoticed. 
On July 1, 1980, the government nearly doubled the price of meat. Workers 
reacted immediately with strikes all over Poland. In appeasement, local authorities were 
allowed to offset high prices by increasing pay, with the aim of defusing strikes locally 
and preventing broader repercussions. Nevertheless, this plan failed and even encouraged 
more striking, because only strikers got higher wages.31 By mid-July, a large portion of 
the country was hamstrung, and blocked railways between the Polish city of Lublin and 
Russia alarmed both the party and the Soviets.32 Rescindment of the price hikes was by 
no means the only demand of striking workers. They also insisted on family allowances 
like the police and military had and new elections for trade unions.33 Most strikes were 
settled on the basis of variable pay increases, which were negotiated in Lublin between 
government representatives and workers and elsewhere through local authorities. At the 
same time, the KOR was warning that inflation would soon consume salary increases and 
workers should not concentrate on that issue alone, but also on defending their 
constitutional right to free associations such as trade unions.34  
Those strikes, which were an important influence on the Gdansk strikes in 
August, showed the party’s willingness to talk with worker representatives, omitting 
entirely a bureacracy of party-controlled trade unions to achieve quick settlement. 
Moreover, it proved the responsibility and strict discipline of workers, who avoided street 
demonstration and, except for an incident in Lublin, unblocked the rail lines so as not to 
provoke the Soviets.35 What is more, the July strikes contributed to the establishment of 
                                                 
30 Nicholas G. Andrews, Poland 1980-81. Solidarity versus the Party (National Defense University 
Press, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC, 1985), 23. 
31 Jadwiga Staniszkis, Poland’s self-limiting revolution, ed. Jan T. Gross (Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, New Jersey, 1984), 3. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid., 4. 
35 Nicholas G. Andrews, Poland 1980-81. Solidarity versus the Party (National Defense University 
Press, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC, 1985), 26. 
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an information network. The main contributor was the KOR, which set up a central 
information system to collect news about the strikes and pass it to Western 
correspondents in Warsaw, who in turn conveyed the information to Western media, 
which broadcast it to Poland. As a result, the people could get detailed information on 
what was happening in their country when the Polish censor-controlled media did not 
even mention the upheaval in current events.36 
On August 14, 1980, the workers of the Lenin Shipyard in Gdansk began to strike, 
which to many observers was crucial, due to the fact that shipyard workers were more 
respected among the Polish working class because of their sacrifice and casualties in 
1970. This strike provoked others in Gdynia, Elblag, Szczecin, Lodz, Wroclaw and 
Warsaw. KOR leader Jacek Kuron called it a sensational solidarity strike with political 
character.37 The workers’ first demands were reinstatement of two dismissed shipyard 
workers—Anna Walentynowicz and Lech Walesa—and wage increases, normal pay for 
workers on strike, and approval to build a monument commemorating the victims of 
December 1970. The negotiations between shipyard management and workers were 
almost finished when the workers withdrew because not all their demands were met. 
They saw that if they did not negotiate and succeed in satisfying everyone’s grievances, 
they would lose everything by bargaining alone. They realized that the key to success for 
all workers was in solidarity and unity, and to keep striking was giving them an 
opportunity to win more in terms of democracy, not only economic demands such a free 
trade unions and self-government.38 
As a result, the MKS Inter-factory Strike Committee was established and 
formulated a list of demands. Among them were two concerning abolition of censorship 
and free elections, which were removed from the list before negotiations with party 
                                                 
36 Nicholas G. Andrews, Poland 1980-81. Solidarity versus the Party (National Defense University 
Press, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC, 1985), 26. 
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representatives to avoid echoes of the Czechoslovakian reform movement.39 Among the 
twenty-one demands presented to the party were: 
1. Acceptance of free trade unions, independent of the party 
2. The right to strike and the personal security of strikers and their supporters 
3. Freedoms of speech, press, and publication and access to the mass media 
for all religious denominations 
4. Restoration of rights to persons dismissed in 1970 and 1976 and to 
students expelled from schools for their beliefs, and the release of three 
named political prisoners 
5. Publication by the media of information about the Inter-factory Strike 
Committee and its demands 
6. Informing of the public about the economic crisis and inducing public 
discussion of the reform program 
7. Payment to strikers for all strike days at vacation rate  
8. An increase in basic wages by about $600 to compensate for price 
increases 
9. Full supplies of food for the domestic market and export of surplus only; 
abolition of “commercial” prices and sales for foreign currency in special 
shops 
10. Selection of management personnel on the basis of qualification, not party 
affiliation, and abolition of the privileges of the citizens, militia, security 
service, and party apparatchiks 
11. Free Saturdays40   
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After several days of negotiations, on August 31, 1980, an agreement between the 
MKS and the government was signed. The party substantially met the workers’ demands, 
but not all, including, for instance, the right to form independent labor unions and to 
strike, loosening somewhat the censorship of media and agreeing to some economic 
changes. However, the MKS also made concessions. It had to accept the leading role of 
the Communist Party in Poland and declare that new unions would respect the principles 
of the Polish constitution, would not play the role of political party, and would not 
question Polish international alliances. Furthermore, the party would not agree to lower 
the retirement age.41  
Not only did workers achieve victories, but other groups won significant gains. 
The Roman Catholic Church got access to Polish radio to broadcast Sunday Mass, 
journalists got the chance to inform freely about society and the economy, retired persons 
had their pensions increased, young couples could get their dream apartments because of 
faster construction, and everybody hoped for better health services.42  
The strikes of 1980 and subsequent agreement between the MZK and the 
Communist Party proved that the workers could effect a nonviolent, disciplined approach 
and move with unity towards common objectives. It was also the first effective alliance 
between workers and the intelligentsia. Moreover, the Inter-factory Strike Committee set 
an example as an alternative to the party. The inclusion in the workers’ demands of 
economic, social, and political issues began a broader public debate on party policies and 
showed that the party could no longer claim to be the only representative of the working 
class. Party trade unions lost their monopoly and had to compete for workers to join.43 
Furthermore, it was all achieved without force, in contrast to much of Poland’s tragic 
history, where changes were sought through revolution, mainly unsuccessful. The striking 
workers acted on the assumption that violence would bring nothing but violent response, 
and even possibly cause the Soviets to intervene. In 1980, they still remembered the 
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bloodshed of 1970. They took a course of action completely different, and the result, the 
Gdansk Agreement, was the most spectacular peaceful achievement in a communist 
country.44 
C. SOLIDARITY AND MARTIAL LAW IN 1981 
Two weeks after the agreement, workers from almost forty independent unions 
representing all participants in the July and August strikes met in Gdansk. They were 
informed that over three million people had joined or expressed a wish to join the NSZZ 
independent, self-governing trade union, which adopted the name, “Solidarity.” The 
Gdansk shipyard’s strike leader, Lech Walesa was elected chairman.45 A few days later, 
Walesa traveled to Warsaw to register the union. After a month’s delay, the Warsaw 
provincial court registered Solidarity, but with corrections, inserting the formulaic 
recognition of the leading role of the party and declaration not to threaten international 
alliances. Although the Supreme Court removed these controversial formulas several 
days later from the body of the statute, they were put in an appendix, which the union 
accepted as the price of compromise. This event foreshadowed how difficult relations 
with the communist regime would be and marked the first sign that the party would try to 
drift away from the agreement of August 31.46  
Meanwhile, as local leaders of Solidarity struggled to set up completely new trade 
unions, authorities in many regions resisted their intentions, using all possible measures 
to undermine the union’s attempts at organization. Solidarity’s only way of defending 
themselves was to threaten strikes, which they had to use to get anything from the old 
party-dependent unions.47 
Though after the Gdansk agreement Solidarity tried to stay out of politics, 
concentrating only on trade-union issues and the pursuit of a more democratic society 
(not country) within the existing political framework, it became clear that this tactic could 
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only fail. Solidarity started pushing the regime for political solutions that required state 
transformation, having realized that their nonpolitical strategy towards democratization 
was inappropriate: only new political agreement with significant change to the existing 
system of governance could succeed.48 Although Solidarity had significant political 
power through its ability to mobilize millions of strikers, it had no real influence on 
economic decisions, and thus lacked economic power. The Gdansk agreement was not 
followed by broad political change nor by a social revolution against the foundations of a 
centrally planned economy. It allowed the regime to keep power without significant 
concession. The state rulers could make promises they did not intend to keep because 
they knew that the economic burden of strikes was shouldered by the workers, not their 
keepers. Conspicuously, Solidarity lacked a doctrine as to how to solve economic 
problems and take greater responsibility for the course of events in the Polish economy.49   
At Solidarity’s inception, the party’s attitude was ambiguous. Some members 
warned that the real intention of Solidarity was open confrontation with the party and its 
rule. On the other hand, many of Solidarity’s actions were obviously intended only to 
enforce Gdansk and other agreements.50 Nevertheless, when it became clear to the party 
apparat that Solidarity had embraced political as well as social tactics, the party began to 
see a real threat to its interests and a dangerous opponent. 
As the government failed to implement Gdansk and other agreements, and 
Solidarity consequently intensified pressure via strikes on various issues, some party 
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against Solidarity escalated, especially after a meeting of Polish and Soviet leaders in 
Moscow in which the Poles were given a veiled ultimatum to solve their national tensions 
by any available means.52 
The first and best-known time that violence was used against Solidarity happened 
in Bydgoszcz on March 19, 1981. Private farmers, joined by a regional Solidarity leader, 
occupied the local office of the party’s satellite ally, the “Peasant Party,” to enforce the 
full recognition of “Rural Solidarity.” After a couple of hours of slow negotiation at a 
council meeting, the leaders were thrown from the building by two-hundred uniformed 
policemen. For Solidarity, this was nothing more than provocation from a party itching 
for confrontation.53 After Bydgoszcz, the relationship between the party and Solidarity 
deteriorated, in a climate of growing official hostility, deliberate unresponsiveness to the 
Gdansk agreement, and provocations. Food shortages since July 1981 and sharp price 
increases in October launched another wave of strikes in Poland, which were considered 
by the party and army command as justification to use any means against Solidarity.54 
Moreover, in answer to Soviet edginess about the Polish situation and, as they perceived 
it, the party’s retreats before “counterrevolutionary forces,” the new party leader and 
prime minister, General Wojciech Jaruzelski, assured the Soviets that the army was 
prepared to take military action. This guarantee persuaded the Soviets to refrain from 
sending in the combined East German, Czechoslovakian, and Soviet armies.55 
During the closing months of 1981, the party and Solidarity were far from 
reaching any compromise that would satisfy either. On both sides, even moderates lost 
hope in the chance of acceptable compromise.56 At the beginning of December 1981, an 
occupational strike at the Warsaw firefighters’ academy was harshly suppressed by 
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police, with striking cadets expelled from the academy. “It was a scary, efficient 
performance, and one which undoubtedly should have been taken as a warning.”57 
However, Solidarity leaders continued intensifying their responsive, radical tactic, and on 
December 11, while the union’s national commission convened in Gdansk, they send 
word to the party that they would a launch a general strike if the government took steps 
toward emergency powers (for instance, banning strikes).58 
On the night of December 12–13, 1981, the Council of State introduced martial 
law in Poland. General Jaruzelski established the Military Council of National Salvation, 
consisting of twenty-one militaries. Invoking martial law was supposed to be the 
privilege of the parliament, but Jaruzelski did not want to waste time and lose the element 
of surprise. Military and police forces arrested most Solidarity leaders in Gdansk, 
thousands of local leaders and opposition activists, and student- and farmers’ unionists. 
Martial law also 
- cut national and international telephone communications  
- imposed a curfew 
- banned travel between cities 
- forbade meetings of organizations, associations, and societies 
- suspended many organizations, including trade unions 
- closed universities and schools 
- shut down most newspapers and magazines 
- militarized government radio and television 
- militarized certain industrial facilities 
- appropriated Solidarity offices and blocked access  
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- penalized the violation of these regulations.59 
In his address to the Polish nation, General Jaruzelski justified martial law for 
three main reasons:  
- Political—Solidarity extremists were attempting to destroy the legal socialist 
order, and bloodshed loomed as Solidarity called for a general strike 
- Economic—state security was threatened by political wrestling in the 
workplace and growing industrial anarchy. Calling a state of war saved the 
economy from destruction and opened the possibility of financial stabilization 
and economic reform 
- International— Poland’s position in the international and socialist community 
was under threat.60 
The declared state of war allowed the party to protect its state leadership and 
preserve the communist system. It silenced the political and economic views of 
Solidarity, which were deemed intolerable and unacceptable. General Jaruzelski had 
gained extraordinary powers and measures and he wielded them remorselessly to defend 
Polish socialism.61 
Nevertheless, there was scattered resistance to martial law, mainly as strikes in 
large factories; but they were immediately broken by heavily armored police and army, 
who surrounded factories one by one and crushed their gates with tanks and armored cars. 
Although all such reprisals were horrifying, the most infamous suppression occurred at 
the Wujek mine in Katowice, where nine miners were killed and tens of others wounded 
during protests and strikes that lasted about a week after the imposition of martial law. In 
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the aftermath, active resistance to the military regime went passive; but neither active nor 
passive resistance softened any aspect of state policy.62 
The state of war introduced in December 1981 was suspended a year later and 
lifted in July 1983. Its short-term aims had been achieved. The independent social forces 
that had arisen in 1980 in hopes of reform had been destroyed, and political contestation 
and social unrest, quashed. What is more, desirable psychological trauma had been 
induced on the Polish people as all opposition was repressed.  
However, the regime’s long-term objectives, such as halting economic collapse by 
rebuilding the communist system on a new ideological and political framework—with 
new apparatchiks of the party’s choosing—failed.63 In the following years, despite their 
efforts, the communists failed to make any significant improvements to the economy or 
public life generally. Although General Jaruzelski succeeded partially in the arena of 
politics by building confidence in the political efficacy of martial law and its ability to 
safeguard the status quo, nevertheless, he failed utterly to recover the devastated 
economy or improve the standard of living. This incompetency led to a round of strikes in 
the spring and summer of 1988, barely eight years into martial law, which ended in the 
party’s offering to talk with Lech Walesa on the legalization of Solidarity, and 
Solidarity’s subsequent participation in tackling the national crisis.64   
D. THE ROUNDTABLE TALKS AND THE END OF THE COMMUNIST 
REGIME 
In 1988, the spark that ignited the overthrow of the communist regime was, again, 
an increase in food prices—up to 40%. As before, this precipitated massive protests and 
strikes. What is noteworthy, however, is that most of the strikes were not organized by 
Solidarity, but by a younger generation of workers without the experience of physical 
defeat under martial law, demanding real changes in the life of Poland. This meant that 
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not only Solidarity (which was still supported by the masses), but also independent 
representatives of society needed to be heard by the communists. In its own way, Poland 
was transitioning into a pluralist society.65 Solidarity, even divided and unable to attract 
young and radical workers, still remained the symbol of independent society, with Lech 
Walesa as its leader. In August 1988, as a new wave of strikes crossed the country, the 
regime had to admit that the opposition was an important element of the political scene 
and negotiation would be necessary to solve the country’s problems. At the end of the 
month, the communist minister of the interior, Czeslaw Kiszczak, publicly offered, on 
Jaruzelski’s approval, roundtable discussions with Solidarity—without conditions, and 
not only about the economy, but political issues.66 Although both sides knew that neither 
had credible solutions to the burning problems of an almost-bankrupt nation, they needed 
to work together to save the Polish economy, which would not be accomplished without 
high sacrifice by society.67  
On February 6, 1989 fifty-five delegates, twenty nine from the party apparat and 
twenty six from the opposition—plus three observers from the Catholic Church—met 
officially at the roundtable, after a couple of informal meetings between representatives 
in the months before. Actual negotiations took place in ad-hoc groups in which 
roundtable participants were supported by experts in the issues discussed.68 “The 
symbolism of a roundtable…was that it minimized the confrontational aspects of the 
negotiations and suggested the community of interests of all Poles.”69 
There were three main areas of negotiation and several smaller subtables and 
working groups to discuss particular problems. The major tables discussed: 
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- union pluralism and legalization of the Solidarity trade union 
- political reforms, to agree on conditions under which Solidarity could 
participate in elections 
- social, economic policy, and systemic reforms to reach agreement on 
Solidarity’s economic proposals70 
At the tables of economic policy and political reforms, subtables were established 
on the following topics: 
- legal and judicial reform 
- media policy 
- local government 
- associations 
- education, research, and development 
- the problems of the younger generation 
- housing policy 
- agriculture and rural social policy 
- mining 
- health care 
- the environment71 
Solidarity perceived the government’s offer as a new social contract, whereby 
union legalization and minority representation in Parliament would bring co-
responsibility for a new economic program—as well as for any unpleasant fallout. In 
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return, partially free elections and the creation of a constitutional presidency would allow 
the party to retain overall control of the political process.72 
On April 5, 1989, two months after official negotiations began, Solidarity and the 
government met again at the roundtable to accept their agreement. The most significant 
achievements of the Roundtable Talks were: 
- restoration of Solidarity and the promise of legalization for an independent 
students’ union 
- elections on June 4, 1989, for a two-house parliament, in which free 
competition would be permitted for 35% of the 460 seats in the existing lower 
house, the Sejm 
- restoration of the upper house (the senate) disbanded after WWII, with a 
hundred members chosen in completely free elections. The upper house would 
have veto over the lower house 
- establishment of the office of “president of the republic,” elected by the two 
houses of Parliament for a six-year term, with broad powers to dissolve 
Parliament and veto laws passed by the lower house (overturnable by two-
thirds vote) 
- changes in the structure of the economy73 
It has been claimed that the last point was the least successful—quite ironically, 
because the economy was at the center of the original anti-crisis pact proposed by 
Solidarity in 1988. “The main reason was that at this field the most tangible interests of 
state, party and economic bureaucracies were at stake. These interests were not 
                                                 
72 Gale Stokes, The Walls Came Tumbling Down. The Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe 
(Oxford University Press, New York, Oxford, 1993), 125. 
73 Peter Cipkowski, Revolution in Eastern Europe: understanding the collapse of communism in 
Poland, Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Romania and the Soviet Union (John Wiley & Sons, 
Inc., New York, 1991), 24. 
 25
compromised by the government. As a result, even a soft statement about the desirability 
of a market economy was unacceptable to the government.”74 
The Roundtable Talks and subsequent events in Poland changed the history of 
Poland and Eastern Europe. On elections held June 4, 1989, Solidarity was 
overwhelmingly victorious, winning 160 of the contested seats in the lower house and 
ninety-nine of the hundred seats in the upper house. The election exposed the inability of 
the Communist Party to command the support of the people—it was, in fact, an utter 
rejection of communism.75 Two months later, after the communists, led by martial-law 
author Czeslaw Kiszczak, had failed to form a government, Solidarity and two former 
communist-satellite parties created a majority coalition and proposed a former dissident, 
Tadeusz Mazowiecki, as prime minister. Mazowiecki was elected chief of government on 
August 24, 1989, the first non-communist to hold the position since 1948.76 The next 
year brought a raft of political and economical reforms that finally ended more than forty 
years of communist rule. At the end of 1990, Poland elected the former dissident and 
Solidarity leader Lech Walesa as president; the Communist Party was dissolved; and free 
parliamentary elections in the new year finalized the transition from totalitarianism to 
democracy. And as Lech Walesa noted, that transition was an unbloddy, nonviolent, 
evolutionary revolution, unlike the former independence bids of Polish history, which 
were almost all characterized by mortal conflict. 
The Roundtable Talks were criticized after 1989 for Solidarity’s compromise with 
the regime, though compromise had allowed activists to remain on the political scene and 
engage in public life; but undeniably the talks paved the way to the first partially free 
elections in Eastern Europe in fifty years. They allowed the peaceful rejection of a system 
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that exercised ruthless dominance for almost fifty years. “Thus the roundtable 
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III. CURRENT CONTROVERSIES OVER THE POLAND'S 
TRANSITION IN 1989 AND HERITAGE OF COMMUNISM 
A. CONTROVERSIES OVER ACCORDS WITH COMMUNISTS AFTER 
1989 
The Polish transition to democracy and the Roundtable Agreement between the 
opposition and the government played a crucial role in starting a similar process of 
change throughout Eastern Europe. However, events after the talks “obscured the 
negotiations, quickly sweeping away recognition of their importance.”78 The contract 
between the communist government and the opposition was severely criticized when the 
democratic opposition took power. The split within the Polish independence movement 
Solidarity, power struggles among the victors, and growing economic problems brought 
further questioning.79 This split can be seen today among the roundtable talks’ critics and 
supporters. For the radical-right wing of Solidarity, among them Jaroslaw and Lech 
Kaczynski—who took power following the parliamentary and presidential elections of 
2005—the agreement is suspect, a secret deal between parts of the new post-communist 
government. The Kaczynski brothers and their followers denigrate the achievements of 
the roundtable talks, while admitting they were the only possible way of getting rid of 
communist power in Poland; the claim is that subsequent compromises, based on 
interpretations of the original agreement, have been a chain of mistakes by the opposition 
camp.80 The negotiated character of the revolution in 1989, which blunted the need for 
retribution, came in for condemnation from the right wing, who blamed the policy for 
having allowed former communists to gain power again barely three years after the 
roundtable talks of 1993.81  
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Nevertheless, Poland’s democratic opposition could not have taken power directly 
before 1988, since the communists were still too strong, at least on the surface. It took 
almost ten years to finally defeat the communist regime and change the system. With no 
sudden break with the past, the transition occurred in peaceful, carefully negotiated 
increments, “with Solidarity leadership well aware of its pioneering role in Eastern 
Europe and of the danger inherent therein. The experience of the 1981 martial law and 
the continued threat of direct Soviet intervention…were in the minds of the Solidarity 
leadership in 1989, while the disintegration of the country’s economy was the most 
urgent concern.”82 Because the system was weakening, the official political elite started 
issuing signals that the opposition could get access to power, which meant (in effect) 
sharing responsibility for the nation’s deterioration. However, “the social pressure, 
especially strikes and the opposition refusal to accept the co-optation strategy opened the 
way to the roundtable talks.”83 
The first non-communist prime minister in Poland, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, has 
claimed that the peaceful transition to democracy, without bloodshed, was the most 
significant achievement of Poland, the beginning of great changes in Poland and great 
changes in Europe, and that no other chance to win against the communists existed. This 
fact cannot be neglected—and should not be taken to imply that there were secret deals 
with communists. Though nothing was done perfectly in the events after 1989, the 
necessity for continuing work in no way devalues the significant gains of the roundtable 
talks.84 
Barely seven years after the imposition of martial law, the alternative of 
confrontation was unrealistic not only for Solidarity, but also for communist side. “Over 
fifteen years the authorities had done everything in their power, …, to eliminate 
opposition; there was nothing left to be tried to reach that objective. … The politics of 
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confrontation pursued by either side could produce no outright winner.85 The form of 
national reconciliation first discussed in 1981 prevailed at the end. “At that time two 
variants were considered: a tripatriate agreement among party, Church and Solidarity and 
a more contrived coalition consisting of the three governing parties, communist and 
Solidarity trade unions, the Church and Catholic lay groups represented in the Sejm.”86 
Because both sides rejected those variants, martial law was imposed in December 13, 
1981. In 1988, however, the apparat and Solidarity returned to the first of these formulas 
as an acceptable way to solve political and economic problems of Poland.  
The classic and tragic scenario of the French Revolution was not followed by 
Poland, whose course has been called “self-limiting revolution or evolutionary 
revolution”.87 The non-revolutionary character of Poland’s transformation was successful 
because “the Solidarity leadership had learned a bitter lesson about the limits to its power. 
….  In December 1981, they learned that symbolic and emotional support cannot prevail 
over pure might. However, the durability of social resistance was an important factor that 
pressed the government toward recognition of the opposition as a real force in society an 
as a credible partner in negotiations.”88 What is more, in 1988 the reemerging but 
weakened Solidarity had to accept compromise since the possibility of a peaceful 
continuation of the “self-limiting revolution was the only real one. Only negotiations 
could finish more than 40 years of totalitarianism in Poland.89” In 1976, Jacek Kuron, 
one of the cofounders of KOR, urged opposition to violence in the struggle for regime 
change in his famous statement "instead of burning the party committees, build your own 
committees,"90 pointing the way Polish opposition should deal with the regime.  
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Some have complained that the roundtable talks in 1989 were a mistake in that 
they only revived the communists. The assertion is made that communism would have 
collapsed sooner or later without the agreements, which only allowed them to remain in 
politics. However, in 1989 “neither the American nor European politicians, nor the 
sociologists, nor the Sovietologists, nor even Pope John Paul II—nobody in the world had 
such confidence at the time.”91 “The ‘roundtable’ compromise created a political culture 
in which there is a place for every citizen and a culture of debate and cooperation rather 
than rancor and revenge.”92 
Others have criticized the roundtable talks as “a national betrayal,” a secret 
conspiracy between the system and oppositionist elites—that is, the roundtable talks did 
not have a societal mandate. Any political alliances between Solidarity and the 
communist government are seen in this view as nothing but a plot aimed at retaining the 
influence of communist elites. This theory insists that the only acceptable alliances with 
communists were strictly economic, without any political connotations or background 
and without assuming any shared responsibility for the whole Polish mess.93 Moreover, 
concession was unnecessary; the regime was losing its legitimacy and power, but the 
opposition granted them the chance to retain significant authority and control over many 
aspects of contemporary Poland. The Roundtable Agreements allowed former 
communists with business connections to make fortunes, whereas the rest of society, 
including those of undeniable merit in defeating communism, had to bear the burden of 
transformation, paying high price of devotions and recantations. The agreement created a 
Poland in which egoism, greed, and connections with the former secret police allowed 
crooks to get ahead at the expense of everyday, honest people. Moreover, the lack of 
decommunization after 1989 is held to have created most of Poland’s current problems. 
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The non-pursuit of communists is seen as a remnant of the Roundtable Agreements and 
an act of malfeasance that enabled corrupt systems based on the old communist secret 
services and post-communist circles to flourish. It would have been desirable, critics say, 
were those who supported totalitarianism barred from important positions in the 
democratic state of Poland. Instead, people who were persecuted during communism and 
left with meager retirements saw their persecutors in the secret police lead comfortable 
lives on benefits allowing much higher standards.94 
Another criticism from the right is that Solidarity and its moderate representatives 
helped communist nomenklatura maintain their interests and spheres of influence. They 
excluded radical dissidents, called “extremists,” from negotiations and regime 
transformation. Most anti-roundtable critics point out that Tadeusz Mazowiecki’s 
government, following the agreement, made the process of transformation too slow and 
ineffective. “Thick line,” fear form the completely free elections, negligence in the 
removing of Soviet troops from Polish territory, protection of communist party 
influences, and maintaining public servants and secret police officers in their old 
positions, as well as secret acceptance of the process of destroying party documents and 
secret police files.95 Such critics have demanded a total opening of secret police files, 
decommunization, and prosecution for crimes committed against the people under 
communism.  
Despite the controversies in recent years over the events of 1989 and accords with 
the communists, there has been a countervailing tendency in Poland to judge that the 
agreements between the government and opposition were an expression of maturity. The 
decisions made were crucial to regime transformation and democratic reform.96 The 
Polish model set an example followed by other countries, such as Czechoslovakia, with 
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its velvet revolution.97 Polish “evolutionary revolution” brought significant and positive 
changes to Poland: for instance, a strong presidency, a senate, and a great deal of 
legislation inspired by Solidarity’s roundtable demands. Moreover, “the mechanism of 
solving social conflicts by negotiations” and the “spirit of the round table” continue to be 
dearly held values and guideposts for political behaviors.”98 The roundtable talks may be 
called the symbol of the creation of the Third Republic of Poland and of achieving social 
freedom and state sovereignty.99 
 B. THE HERITAGE OF COMMUNISM: LUSTRATION AND 
DECOMMUNIZATION IN POLAND AFTER 1989 
1.  Lustration 
 Lustration refers to the screening (or vetting) of candidates for and holders of 
important public offices to “eliminate” (usually bar for a certain period) former secret-
police collaborators.100 This issue arrived with democratic breakthrough in 1989 and still 
raises strong emotions in politics and society. This question is not unique to Poland and, 
as in all newly emerging democracies that have had to deal with the problem, is a still a 
matter of debate. Systematically vetting public officials for links with the communist-era 
security services is controversial in many post-communist states.101 
 The first post-communist Polish government was unwilling to pursue lustration. 
The policy of “thick line,” introduced by the first non-communist prime minister, 
Tadeusz Mazowiecki, rejected the course of action in the name of reconciliation and 
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transformation. The true meaning of these words is still contested, as Mazowiecki 
claimed he meant to symbolically divide the old and new Poland and separate his 
government’s responsibility from that of the old regime. 
 However, the speech was widely interpreted as excluding the former 
communist establishment from punishment for its mistakes. The 
Mazowiecki government's policy certainly did not include lustration in the 
sense of weeding out and banning from public office former communist 
officials, secret service informers and other collaborators with the 
communist system of power. Rather than applying collective guilt for 
former party or secret service activity, the new government pledged itself 
to de-communise through dismantling the communist power monopoly 
and assessing supporters of the previous regime on the basis of their actual 
performance and loyalty toward the new government.102 
There were several reasons for this policy toward lustration. Among them were classical 
liberal arguments against applying collective guilt, respect for the rule of law, the fact 
that secret-police files could be untrustworthy, and the perception that lustration would be 
politically destabilizing. The new government had to deal with an economy in severe 
crisis while the communists retained considerable influence over the political process.103  
 However, it does not mean that Mazowiecki’s government did nothing about the 
old communist cadres. There was considerable personnel change in a number of 
important spheres of public life. Verification commissions were set up to check 
individual service records at all levels of the legal system. These changes were not 
presented officially as verification, however, to avoid sensationalism. This factor, as well 
as growing public frustration and dissatisfaction with the social consequences of 
economic reforms, influenced dissatisfaction with “thick line” policy in the following 
years.104 The policy, which might have been a good way to avoid destructiveness in the 
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transition phase, came under attack for allowing communist nomenklatura to remain in 
public life. And it started coming back on the agenda politically, being raised mainly by 
the right wing of Solidarity, such as the Center Agreement and Christian National Union. 
These parties won relative success during the first fully free parliamentary elections in 
October 1991.105 
After these elections, Jan Olszewski, a committed anti-communist and supporter 
of lustration and decommunization, was nominated as prime minister. President Walesa 
did not support this candidate; however, Olszewski was the only one who could gain a 
vote of confidence in parliament. The Olszewski government came to power promising a 
clean break with the communist past. In Olszewski's view, Mazowiecki did not do 
enough to ex-communists, and Jan Krzysztof Bielecki, who was prime minister after 
Mazowiecki, had continued the same policy.106 The Olszewski government believed that 
thick line allowed those who had committed crimes to cover them up with impunity while 
retaining wealth and privilege obtained at the expense of the people.107  
On May 28, 1992, the Sejm adopted a controversial resolution demanding 
information about high-ranking public officials and a release to the public of all names of 
those who had cooperated with the communist security services.108 Accordingly, on June 
4 the minister of the interior, Antoni Macierewicz, delivered a list of sixty-four alleged 
secret agents and collaborators to party leaders in the Sejm. A second list of thirty-seven 
was passed through a narrower group of officials, including the Sejm and Senat speakers 
and President Walesa. However, the content of those lists proved controversial, because 
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they did not reliably show collaboration; they included the names not only of genuine 
collaborators but also of people the secret police had tried, but failed, to recruit. 109 As 
fallout, Olszewski’s government was dismissed and the impression was left that releasing 
the lists on the day before a no-confidence vote was a desperate attempt to save a 
crumbling administration by discrediting its opponents. This incompetent and apparently 
politically motivated attempt to reveal collaborators with the communist secret services 
seemed to discredit lustration per se. It demonstrated how lustration could be manipulated 
to achieve short-term political objectives.110 
Shortly after the revealing of the lists, the Polish Constitutional Tribunal agreed 
that the resolution was unconstitutional. The judges claimed that the resolution did not 
provide necessary protections of human rights and violated the rule of democratic law. As 
a result of this verdict, execution of the resolution was suspended and a special 
parliamentary commission acknowledged that the minister of the interior had acted 
improperly. Macierewicz was accused by the prosecutor of breaking the law concerning 
national secrets. Nevertheless, the court said that the former minister could be judged 
only by the Tribunal of the State, which dealt with high officials suspected of crimes 
against the state and nation.111 Several persons named by the interior minister as 
collaborators requested and received a public apology from the ministry, which asserted 
that it was impossible to make a conclusive determination of collaboration based solely 
on its files.112 
This infamous attempt at lustration activated several groups and political parties 
to prepare their own lustration proposals. Within two months, six draft bills were 
submitted to Parliament and, despite strong opposition from the post-communist parties, 
                                                 
109 Aleks Szczerbiak, Dealing with the Communist Past or the Politics of the Present? Lustration in 
Post-Communist Poland, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 54, No. 4. (June 2002), 
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=09668136%28200206%2954%3A4%3C553%3ADWTCPO%3E2.0.CO%3B
2-2 (accessed March 18, 2008). 
110 Ibid. 
111 Lustracja w Polsce-20 lat za późno, Gazeta Wolni i Solidarni, March 23, 2007, 
http://www.gazetagazeta.com/artman/publish/article_17375.shtml (accessed March 18, 2008). 
112 Maria Los, Lustration and Truth Claims: Unfinished Revolutions in Central Europe, Law & Social 
Inquiry, Vol. 20, No. 1. (Winter, 1995), http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0897-
6546%28199524%2920%3A1%3C117%3ALATCUR%3E2.0.CO%3B2-U (accessed March 17, 2008). 
 36
were sent to relevant parliamentary commissions for consideration. However, the whole 
process was slowed by systematic resistance from Democratic Left Alliance deputies. 
Before parliamentary elections in September 1993, most parties revealed publicly their 
views on the issue of lustration. Only the two parties clearly linked to the former 
Communist Party strongly opposed lustration, but considerable opposition was also 
expressed by Tadeusz Mazowiecki’s Democratic Union. After elections and the creation 
of a ruling majority coalition by the two post-communist parties, the former 
nomenklatura returned to important posts and took control of the legislative process. In 
June 1994, two new lustration bills prepared by opposition parties were voted down on 
the first reading. The only bill approved for further deliberation was a de facto anti-
lustration measure submitted by the Democratic Left Alliance, the leading post-
communist party.113 
The idea of legally regulated lustration was brought back at the beginning of 1996 
after the forced resignation of Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy over accusations of 
collaboration with the Soviet Union’s secret police. A few lustration bills were  submitted 
to the Sejm. In January of 1997, a special parliamentary commission adopted a common 
project of the legislature concerning lustration, including a proposal from all parties 
holding parliamentary seats and President Aleksander Kwasniewski. However, during 
further consultation, this proposal was rejected by the governing post-communist party, 
the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), who demanded amendments.114 Nevertheless, a 
centrist coalition comprising the opposition Freedom Union (UW), Labor Union (UP) 
and, crucially, the Polish Peasant Party (PSL)—the junior governing partner of the 
Democratic Left Alliance—had the parliamentary strength to resist the SLD.115  
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The Sejm approved the lustration bill in April 1997. Among its 460 members, 214 
voted in favor, 162 against, and sixteen abstained. The Senat approved the bill in May 
1997. Among a hundred senators, forty-seven voted for it and thirty-three against. The 
bill could still have been blocked if President Kwasniewski had exercised his veto power, 
given that the lustration coalition lacked the two-thirds parliamentary majority required to 
overturn it.116 Nevertheless, in spite of intense pressure from his SLD supporters, 
Kwasniewski signed the bill into law in June 1997, although he later requested that the 
Constitutional Tribunal abrogate some of its provisions.117 The act, “On The Revealing 
of Work or Service in State Security Organs or of Collaboration With Them Between 
1944 and 1990 by Persons Holding Public Positions” (the Polish lustration act) came into 
force August 3, 1997 and was several times amended. On October 21, 1998, the 
Constitutional Tribunal upheld the act. However, in a subsequent decision of November 
10, 1998, it found two of its provisions unconstitutional.118 
“The main feature of the Polish lustration act is verification of affidavits 
submitted by persons who apply for positions specified by the act as to whether they 
worked or collaborated with security services of the communist regime. The substance of 
these affidavits, if they reveal collaboration, is officially published in Monitor Polski (the 
Polish Monitor), the government gazette.”119 However, this act did not ban persons who 
admitted collaboration from holding public positions; the decision was left to the person 
appointing or the verdict of voters.120 This legislation created a special lustration 
prosecutor, the spokesperson of the public interest (RIP), and approved the Warsaw court 
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of appeal as a lustration court. Lustration of an individual can be initiated by the RIP at 
court or by a member of parliament as well.  
The court decides whether the affidavit is true or false, or orders a 
suspension of the case. The lustrated person is in the position of an 
accused according to criminal law and she can appeal the judgment. The 
results of the lustration are published in the Polish Monitor. A false 
affidavit is sanctioned by the loss of moral qualification for ten years, 
which implies the loss of the right of access to any public positions for that 
duration.121 
Public positions affected by the act include the highest constitutional officials, 
such as the president, members of parliament, and persons assigned, elected, or appointed 
by the president and other constitutional entities. The provisions also include senior 
public officials, judges, prosecutors, advocates, media leaders, and the Ministry of Public 
Security and the Committee for Public Security Affairs and their subordinated units, the 
security services (secret police), army intelligence and counterintelligence, and other 
services of the military forces. The lustration act also covers civil and military organs and 
foreign institutions that were engaged in tasks similar to the mentioned organs.122 
2. Decommunization 
Decommunization is a legislative ban on the performance of certain public 
functions and holding of certain positions in the political, economical and societal spheres 
by members of Communist Party nomenklatura and activists, as well as representatives of 
the communist regime’s holding some positions in that system. It means political, 
historical, and legislative dealing with communist times and a barring from positions of 
public responsibility the former high officials of the party and their apparatus of 
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enforcement.123 The various attempts to regulate the issue of decommunization in Poland 
have evoked broad discussion and argument.124  
In Poland, nineteen years after the Roundtable Talks, the problem of 
decommunization still exists and has not found solution in any legislation or regulation, 
despite a few attempts to deal with the issue. Decommunization was included in the 
electoral platforms of a number of the political parties that governed Poland in the past 
several years. Critics of the contemporary situation, in which a significant number of 
former communists still remain in public life, blame the 1989 agreement, when the 
nomenklatura were granted beneficial positions in Polish society. The best time to 
conduct decommunization was wasted and communists were allowed to maintain their 
influence in the new democracy.125 The evolutionary character of the Polish revolution 
from 1989, although it finished communist rule, did not bring change to the composition 
of the elites; a marked continuity could be seen in post–1989 Poland. About one-third of 
1988’s elite-position holders in politics, culture, and the economy held the same or 
comparable positions in 1993. In some sectors, a continuity of fifty percent was 
maintained among economic elites. Moreover, substantial proportions of the “new” elites 
in 1993 had been “deputies” and other influentials just below the top nomenklatura rank 
in 1988.126 Change in the orientation of the elites enabled them to adapt to, and even 
thrive in, post-communist economic and political conditions. A good example is 
Aleksander Kwasniewski, the president of Poland in the years 1995–2005. Kwasniewski 
was a junior minister in Poland's last communist government, but Poles elected him in 
November 1995 in part because they perceived him as representing the “new,” forward-
looking, pragmatic generation of leaders.  
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During and after the transitions of 1989-91, communist leaders scrambled 
to protect their power bases or to create new ones. Their maneuvers were 
varied. Some negotiated places for themselves in post-communist regimes 
through the famous ‘roundtable talks.’ Many cashed in the credits they had 
accumulated through patron–client networks and appropriated large parts 
of state–industrial enterprises (‘nomenklatura privatization’); still others 
colluded in ‘mafia’ activities to profit from weakened state oversight and 
regulation.127  
The survival of nomenklatura members was generally higher in the economic and 
administrative than in the political field, and more pronounced among less-important 
communist activists than top leaders. The most politically visible and discredited leaders 
of the communist establishment were of course removed quickly and publicly from 
position; however, the bulk of former communist party and governmental elites, even 
after broad changes in politics and free elections at various levels of government, still 
remained in position.128 Unlike most previous revolutions, the revolution of 1989 did not 
produce a counter-elite dedicated to the imposition of democratic order and the 
liquidation of elites associated with communism. As a result, most elites associated with 
the old order adapted to democratization without major loss.129 
In the aftermath of the Roundtable Talks, a few legislative initiatives were 
proposed, but none has succeeded so far. The first debate on decommunization was 
conducted in January 1992 and concerned the project of legislation with two chapters 
about decommunization. Nevertheless, this project was rejected broadly in the 
parliament. In the Polish senate on July 1992, qualifications for public positions were 
raised, with the intention of barring those who sustained the structures of totalitarianism. 
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important offices for some time. This project was passed by the Senat and forwarded to 
the Sejm, but following new elections in September 1993, the victorious Post-Communist 
Party dropped the issue.130 
The next time the Parliament tackled decommunization was in October 1999. This 
project, prepared by right-wing parliamentarians, proposed that former highly placed 
apparatchiks not be allowed to hold responsible positions in state administration for ten 
years. A five-year term ban would apply to political workers of the Communist Party, 
rectors of party universities and academies, chiefs of a few party newspapers, and heads 
of public television, radio, and information agencies. Those sanctions would not preclude 
the right to be a candidate for the Polish parliament or presidency. This legislation, 
although imposing a few significant bans on the nomenklatura, was aimed mainly to 
publicly condemn them for having been part of a totalitarian regime responsible for more 
than forty years’ state and economic dependence on the particular interests of the Soviet 
Union. However, the parliament, despite its right-wing majority, did not approve the 
project, to the astonishment of observers.131 
After the elections of 2001, when the Post-Communist party won 
overwhelmingly, it was more than obvious that decommunization would not be discussed 
in Parliament. Nevertheless, the radical party of the League of Polish Families submitted 
decommunization legislation, which was not even initially discussed by the Post-
Communist-dominated parliament. This project proposed that people who from July 1994 
to July 1989, during the communist dictatorship, were acting against the interests of the 
Polish nation, would lose the right to hold public positions. It included people holding 
leading positions in party structures, apparatus, schools, and newspapers. It also proposed 
the creation of a twelve-member commission to judge whether an individual was holding 
 
 
                                                 
130 Jan Maria Jackowski, Dekomunizacja po polsku, Nasz Dziennik nr 59, March 10-11, 2007, 
http://www.naszdziennik.pl/index.php?typ=my&dat=20070310&id=my21.txt (accessed March 15, 2008). 
131 Ibid. 
 42
certain positions during the communist reign.132 As mentioned above, this project had no 
chance in that parliament, which postponed the discussion of decommunization until the 
next parliamentary campaign in 2005. 
C. THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS OF 2005, THE “PEACE AND 
JUSTICE” PARTY VICTORY, AND THE LUSTRATION LAW OF 2006 
 “The removal of former agents and collaborators of the security services from 
important state functions, together with the enactment of legal measures to prevent them 
from assuming such functions in the future, is a basic requirement of justice and an 
essential condition for the safe development of democracy in Poland.”133 So the problem 
of lustration and decommunization came back to the attention of public opinion during 
the 2005 parliamentary elections. The opposition party “Peace and Justice” made 
lustration and decommunization the main planks of its electoral platform. Party leaders 
Lech and Jaroslaw Kaczynski, twin brothers, maintained that Poland’s difficult situation 
had its roots in a badly chosen road of transformation after the regime change in 1989. 
Communist Poland was a deeply pathological country and the newly democratic Third 
Republic of Poland had inherited many of its deficiencies. The Kaczynski brothers made 
up the theory of “uklad,” a supposed network of communist-era spies and their allies in 
business and public services that they blamed for Poland's troubles since 1989.134  
To fight uklads and break with the past, they came up with the idea of a Fourth 
Republic of Poland, a democratic country free of ties with the past and based on social 
equity and Catholic and family values. The first step was to clean up the heritage of 
communism and destroy uklad remnants.135 
They proposed that lustration still be conducted and its range broadened to 
include members of the National Security Council and Financial Policy Council, the 
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management of strategic banks, ambassadors, and persons in professions of public trust 
such as teachers and academic faculties. What is more, every citizen should have right to 
access his secret police files and reveal its contents to the public. All collaborators and 
workers of the communist secret police should be known to the public, and files 
concerning persons in public positions should be commonly accessible. As a logical next 
step after lustration, they also announced an intention of decommunization, with plans to 
liquidate all institutions considered to have been infiltrated by communists, to deprive 
communist activists of privileges, and to reveal the mechanisms by which communism 
persisted in the guise of a successor “post-communist” party, the Democratic Left 
Alliance.136 
As a result of aggressive electoral campaigning and voter fatigue from four years 
of Democratic Left Alliance scandals and corruption, Peace and Justice, surprisingly, 
against all polls, won election in 2005. The next year, after forming a governing coalition 
with the radical League of Polish Families and the populist Self-Defense Party, Peace and 
Justice proposed a new lustration law, which was enacted in October 2006 and, after 
presidential amendments, enforced in March 2007. 
This legislation required that the files of secret police concerning sources of 
information be fully revealed. It also broadened access to files regarding collaborators 
with the secret police and those in the secret police’s sphere of interest as a danger to the 
existing political order. It sustained the ten-year ban from public office of those who 
would not admit cooperation with the communist secret services. It established also the 
notion that cooperation with the secret police included passive awareness of its activity 
while holding a position, function, occupation, or service of responsibility, if information 
was divulged with the intention of violating freedoms and rights. Moreover, lists of 
persons collaborating with communist public-order services would be published, 
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including officers of those services, people persecuted by them, and members of the 
communist nomenklatura including the Communist Party leaders.137 
Persons born before August 1, 1972 and holding any public position were obliged 
to submit a statement concerning their relations with the communist secret police. If they 
refused, they would lose their positions. All these statements would be published. The 
legislation also established two groups of people, one whose files would be fully 
accessible to everybody and another whose content could be restricted. In the first group 
were the president, members of Parliament, important state functionaries, presidents and 
mayors of cities, chiefs of courts, chiefs of offices of prosecutors, and managers of media. 
In the second group were members of local governments, workers for the Institute of 
National Remembrance (IPN), judges, prosecutors, attorneys, public notaries, scientists, 
managers of state-owned enterprises, principles of schools, and journalists. The law 
generally required up to 700,000 people to confess whether they were secret-service 
informants.138 
The authenticity of those statements would be checked by the lustration bureau of 
IPN. In case of doubt, the bureau would demand explanations from the suspect and send 
the case to court. A verdict that information was withheld or falsified would result in 
automatic loss of employment and a ten-year term during which the individual could not 
hold public positions defined by the lustration law.139 
This law was controversial from the beginning and after a couple of months was 
partially struck down by the constitutional tribunal as too wide in scope and properly 
applicable to senior officials only. "Lustration cannot be used to punish people or as a 
form of revenge and the vetting law can only be applied to individuals, not collectively. 
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Government should not seek vengeance in dealing with the country's communist past. 
The state must respect human rights and not have recourse to vengeance.” 140  
The tribunal’s decision was a blow to the Kaczynskis’ campaign to root out ex-
communist influence and secret police collaborators from public life. Although they tried 
to pressure the Polish Constitutional Tribunal to reveal information concerning the 
alleged cooperation of two of its judges with the secret police, the tribunal was not 
dissuaded from stopping the “moral revolution” pursued by the Kaczynski brothers. 
Attempts to reveal the truth are essential; however, it cannot be tolerated that the process 
of lustration and decommunization go along with a revolution against the values that 
made peaceful transition from totalitarianism possible.141 The Kaczynskis stated that if 
the tribunal struck down their lustration law, they would pass a new one, making 
thousands of secret-police files public despite serious doubts regarding their veracity, 
which was found to be fictional in several recent high-profile cases.142 Nevertheless, they 
did not keep their promise or carry out their threat to expose files to the public, because a 
few months later the government lost a vote of confidence—and the following 
parliamentary election as well. 
The lustration law sparked huge discussion. The decision was a stunning victory 
for the law’s opponents, led by former dissidents and Solidarity activists, historian and 
former minister of foreign affairs Bronislaw Geremek, and the first non-communist prime 
minister, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, who stood in the first line of the fight to strike down the 
legislation.143 They refused to sign declarations concerning their past, claiming that this 
law brought the logic of revenge to the borders of irrationality and increased the risk of 
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political manipulation, because it was supported by secret-police files that were often 
incomplete or partly destroyed and capable of being forged. Many journalists, university 
rectors, and scholars also refused to sign declarations, saying the law was itself 
reminiscent of communist times, when people were forced to sign loyalty pledges.144 
Critics also said that screening laws, however well meant, tended to hit 
collaborators—perhaps coerced at the time and remorseful now—more than perpetrators. 
Heavy vetting was seen as a cumbersome way of dealing with the uklad. “A better one 
would be to make the economy more open, so that connections ceased to matter. They 
called the law unacceptable on both moral and legal grounds, which put its authors 
beyond the pale of Western civilization. The final version proposed by the president is 
vague, lacking a clear definition of collaboration.”145 What is more and worse, the 
government had created a paranoid atmosphere in which secret materials were close to 
becoming political currency. “Government critics complained of being bugged: hard to 
prove, but a fear rarely expressed since the collapse of communism.”146  
Some of the critics maintained that lustration had become a tool not only of 
revenge, but of politics. “What may look like an effort to reconcile with the Communist 
past is something else entirely. It is an assault on reconciliation and a generational bid for 
power. Difficulties with gripping the past in Poland come partially from too smooth 
transition. If communism had collapsed abruptly, swift retribution would have been more 
likely.”147 Moreover, the crucial problem of defining an “agent” remained.  
Under Communism, the secret service was omnipresent. It harassed large 
numbers of people, forcing many to sign loyalty declarations or to 
collaborate. Most people told them lies, signed the declarations and went 
home. In 2000, the Supreme Court declared that those who had merely 
appeared to cooperate, but who avoided providing the security services 
with any vital information, could not be considered collaborators, even if 
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they signed agreements and met with agents. Certainly, there were people 
in cells of the Solidarity underground who got paid to spy on their best 
friends, and these people did real damage. Unfortunately, the secret police 
files do not distinguish at first sight between them and others who did not 
do much harm. To make a valid accusation, it was necessary to analyze the 
files and other evidence in detail. But this process was too slow for the 
advocates of de-communization, many of whom have always wanted to 
use the secret police files as a tool in fighting their opponents.148  
Lustration can also be harmful if done improperly. “When historians and some 
journalists received access to the files, leaks soon began to attract media attention. In 
January 2005, the entire list of more than 120,000 names was leaked from the Institute of 
National Remembrance, where the files are held. The list did not discriminate between 
agents and those who were merely under surveillance. As a consequence, lustration in 
Poland became prey for today's hunters, proving again that whenever history falls into the 
hands of politicians, distorted truth becomes an instrument for their own goals.”149 
The new lustration law created a great opportunity for those who would like to get 
rid of their opponents, no matter whether they really collaborated or not. It weakened 
procedural safeguards against false accusation, doing away with the presumption of 
innocence and making it possible to publish the files of anyone active in the public 
sphere. As a result, every sitting or aspiring official who lived under communism was at 
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IV. A COMPARATIVE STUDIES OF COUNTRIES THAT HAD 
TO DEAL WITH THEIR PAST 
A. POST-NAZI GERMANY  
The denazification in Germany after the war was a campaign by the allies to 
obliterate all signs of Nazism in social, political, cultural, educational, legal, and 
economic life and to remove from public positions and punish those who worked for or 
supported Hitler’s regime. This clean sweep would allow the development of a 
democratic Germany.151 
The policy of denazification was first enunciated after the Yalta Conference at the 
beginning of 1945. Leaders of the Big Three agreed that German militarism and Nazism 
had to be destroyed and that it would be necessary to dismantle the Nazi Party and 
associated laws, organizations, and institutions, and remove Nazi and militarist influence 
from public institutions, culture, and the economy.152  
This statement was later expanded at the Potsdam Conference, which asserted that 
the Soviet occupation was aimed at destroying the National Socialist Party and its 
affiliated and supervised organizations; dissolving all Nazi institutions to ensure that they 
were not revivable in any form; and abolishing laws that undergirded the Hitlerian regime 
or discriminated on the grounds of race, creed, or political opinion. Moreover, war 
criminals and those who participated in planning or carrying out Nazi enterprises 
involving or resulting in atrocities or war crimes were to be arrested and brought to 
judgment. Nazi leaders, influential supporters, and high officials of Nazi organizations 
and institutions—and any other persons dangerous to the occupation or its objectives—
would be arrested and interned. All members of the Nazi Party who were more than 
nominal participants in its activities and all other persons hostile to allied purposes would 
be removed from public and semipublic offices and positions of responsibility in 
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important private undertakings. Such persons would be replaced by those who, by their 
political and moral qualities, were deemed capable of helping develop genuine 
democratic institutions in Germany.153 
The issue of denazification appeared on the agenda along with the immediate 
disarmament, demilitarization, decentralization, decartelization, and democratization of 
defeated Germany, 154 so that Germany would never again threaten its neighbors and the 
world. The task of demilitarization and disarmament of the armed forces was undertaken 
swiftly and resolutely by occupying allied forces. However, the matter of 
denazification—removing Nazi institutions, leadership and psychology from German 
life—was far more difficult.155 
Allied troops advancing into Germany arrested war criminals and others 
suspected of affiliation with Nazi organizations and took control of local government and 
administration. They assumed responsibility for resolving communal problems, assuring 
the food supply, repairing damaged utilities, activating police forces, providing 
transportation, and securing at least minimal health standards. However, those tasks were 
not easy if supporters of the Nazis regime were excluded entirely. As Nazi organizations 
were liquidated, their leaders were arrested and supporters were removed from positions 
of authority, paradoxically making denazification more difficult, because it might have 
been more prudential to keep those who were qualified at their jobs. In time, however, 
denazification became top priority, and collaborators were excluded even if it was 
impossible to replace them.156  
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Denazification was based on the directives of the supreme headquarters of the 
allied expeditionary forces and on working regulations, which developed into separate 
military-government laws and directives for Germany. The directives under which the 
Military Government operated were confined primarily to the processes by which Nazis 
and militarists were removed from public office and responsible positions in private 
enterprise, in accordance with the policy expressed by the joint chiefs of staff’s JCS 
1067157 and the Potsdam Declaration. It later evolved into the objective not only of 
removals and exclusions, but also discovery and punishment of active Nazis and 
militarists.158  
The denazification program at the end of 1945 consisted of the following 
elements:  
- “liquidating the Nazi Party, together with its affiliated and subsidiary 
organizations, including the SA (Sturmabteilung), SS (Schutzstaffel), and HJ 
(Hitler Jugend) 
- eradicating of Nazism from German legislation, decrees, and regulations, and  
more specifically the abolition of the Nazi discriminatory laws and decrees  
- changing of names of parks, streets and public ways, institutions and buildings  
named after persons or things associated with Nazism or German militarism, 
removing of movable monuments and statues associated with Nazism and 
German militarism, removing of Nazi emblems, insignia, and symbols from 
statues, monuments, and edifices not amenable to removal pending their 
eventual disposition  
- seizing and holding of premises, property, funds, and loot of the Nazi Party 
and its affiliated and subsidiary organizations and of individual Nazis subject 
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to arrest, seizing and holding of archives of the Nazi Party and its affiliated 
and subsidiary organizations 
- prohibiting of Nazi privileges and benefits and payments of Nazi pensions and 
emoluments 
- arresting and detaining Nazi leaders, influential Nazi supporters, and other 
persons dangerous to the Allied occupation or its objectives 
- removing and excluding from public office and from positions of 
responsibility and importance in quasi-public and private enterprise of 
members of the Nazi Party who had been more than nominal participants in its 
activities, active supporters of Nazism, and other persons hostile to Allied 
purposes 
- preventing Nazi propaganda in any form, and removing of Nazism from 
German information services and media-such as press, radio, the theater, and 
entertainment-and also from education and religion 
- prohibiting German parades, the public playing or singing of Nazi anthems 
and the public display of Nazi flags and other Party insignia and 
paraphernalia.”159 
After some difficulties at the beginning of denazification (which was of course 
not the only task allies had to deal with), it was given priority. The political division of 
the US group, the Control Council for Germany, put higher emphasis on the process, 
engaging more and more military and civilian personnel and setting up special branches 
to do the vetting.160 However, increasing the number of personnel did not bring 
efficiency to the task, since there were thirteen-million people, for instance, who had filed 
questionnaires detailing their previous occupation, activities, memberships, and offices in 
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specified organizations.161 It was found necessary in August 1946 to grant amnesty to at 
least the younger generation, unless they held important positions in the Hitler Youth. A 
second amnesty in December cleared many persons deemed not to have benefited unduly 
from the Nazi regime. Disabled veterans received amnesty as well. These measures 
decreased the pending cases to about two million.162 
To relieve the American government, responsibility for denazification was 
transferred to the Germans with American supervision, under the “Law for the Liberation 
from National Socialism and Militarism,” which came into force on June 1, 1946. The 
Americans maintained that it was according to the best democratic traditions to let the 
Germans purge themselves. Under this law, 545 German tribunals with more than 22,000 
staff were created to finish the process, which was nevertheless difficult in a country still 
suffering from the shock of war. Finding enough judges, prosecutors, and other staff was 
hard, especially since there were Nazi files on almost everyone who aspired to such 
positions. However, denazification proceeded, and in five months the tribunals examined 
almost 600,000 cases, of which 530,000 were eliminated without trial.163 
Statistics of the tribunals showed 930,000 people charged, but only about 21,000 
found guilty as offenders and 1,600 as major offenders. These results seemed 
unimpressive, considering the energy the military government had devoted to 
denazification. Scandals, bribery, and strange verdicts overshadowed the whole process. 
Some of the most notorious Nazis simply escaped amid the bureaucratic confusion and 
disappeared.164 
With the onset of the Cold War, as the political atmosphere changed and 
American attention turned to other matters, it became clear that strengthening the western 
zones would be more important than purging the past or getting rid of efficient 
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administrators who were managers capable of directing industrial enterprises. 
Amendments to the Liberation Law and amnesties from 1947 and early 1948 allowed 
almost every case of even major offenders to be downgraded to lower charges, making 
the offenders eligible for amnesty. By March 1948, the program of denazification was 
terminated, despite the fact that, legally, cases could be heard until the 1950s, when the 
new government of West Germany officially finished the process.165 With the public’s 
increasingly negative assessment of the whole pursuit, the Bundestag took up 
recommendations concerning denazification, called by the Frankfurter Allgemeine 
“liberation from the law of liberation.” Denazification turned out to have been 
inconsequential in practical terms, with many cases of unjust treatment.166     
At the end of 1949, with German chancellor Konrad Adenauer’s acceptance and 
support, the amnesty law, one of the first laws of the German Federal Republic, took 
effect.167 Almost half a million people took advantage of the amnesty, which also applied 
to persons charged with economic offenses during the years of hunger. The strong will 
expressed by the Bundestag in this regard during its first stage of existence brought social 
peace and relief to the criminal courts. The amnesty was a positive indicator of a new 
beginning for society and a new regime, an act of significant political symbolism. “The 
amnesty marked a first confirmation on a federal level of the ‘just leave it behind us’ 
mentality that had already emerged in parts of Germany’s postwar society in 1946–47 
and that had continued growing.”168 It meant stepping on the path of delegitimizing of 
prosecution of crimes committed by Nazis. What is more, there was a feeling that a 
political purge imposed on Germans after the war by the occupational forces was unfair, 
failed, and had to be finished as soon as possible.169 
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In the case of post-Nazi Germany, denazification meant barring certain people 
temporarily from holding important and influential positions, not their permanent 
ineligibility to hold such positions. The same rule applied to confiscated properties, 
which were restored after people were downgraded to a lower category of offense. Thus 
denazification was more a means of rehabilitation than a purge. It concerned particular 
people who could be successfully denazified, rather than the whole of German society.170 
The most important Nazi leaders was eliminated, but most of the collaborationist elite 
remained in or reentered the same positions in administration, justice, education, and the 
economy, that they had held under the Nazis. It became possible for the top level of the 
West German government to consist of those whose experience came from the pre-Hitler 
era working alongside those who had served the Nazi regime, or at least did not oppose 
its rule.171  
B. POST-COMMUNIST CZECHOSLOVAKIA 
Czechoslovakia rejected communism without bloodshed or violence in the very 
short time of several days. Her experience was different from that of Poland, where 
Solidarity struggled almost ten years to reject communist rule and make a compromise 
with communist elites. Barely ten days after the first street demonstration in which people 
demanded political and economic change, the Czechoslovakian Communist Party 
promised to hold free elections and abandon its “leading role.” Two months later, a new 
government with a non-communist majority was formed, subsequently followed by the 
election of an opposition leader, the dissident playwright and leader of Civic Forum 
Vaclav Havel, as president of Czechoslovakia.172  
Civic Forum, initially conceived neither as a political party nor alternative 
government, soon found itself running against communists in parliamentary elections. 
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Colossally popular, Civic Forum was able to defeat communists in elections. After an 
innovative, colorful campaign, during which it had high support according to pre-election 
polls, Civic Forum won the June 1990 election with 48% of the vote. Communist 
candidates were defeated severely and the new president, Vaclav Havel, announced that 
“Czechoslovakia entered an era of national rejuvenation,” adding that “now it is up to us 
alone whether our hopes come to pass, and whether our civic, national, and political self-
confidence reawakens in a historically new way.”173 
However, Czechoslovakia did not survive the “velvet revolution” by more than 
two years, mainly because of ethnic tensions between Czechs and Slovaks and politicians 
whose conduct fuelled the breakup of the union. Czechs felt that Slovaks were taking 
advantage with their demands for budgetary subsidies for Slovakia, while Slovaks felt 
that Czechs were dominating them politically and economically.174 On January 1, 1993 
Czechoslovakia was formally replaced by two independent states, the Czech Republic 
and Slovakia, which formed a customs and monetary union along with other treaties. 
Nevertheless, this close cooperation has faded as a result of general disagreement over 
trade, tariffs, and immigration, as well as the strongly nationalistic culture promoted by 
Slovakian leaders, which was clearly opposed to the liberalism and tolerance of leading 
Czech politicians.175 
Czechoslovakia was one of the first post-communist countries to adopt a severe 
lustration law. Passed by the Czech and Slovak National Assembly in October 1991 
shortly after release of a special parliamentary “Commission of 17 November” report 
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calling attention to some parliamentarians’ connections with the old security services, the 
lustration law encountered strong resistance from many of the former opposition.176   
 The Lustration Law forbade former communist party officials, members of 
People’s Militia, the Members of the National Security Corps and suspected collaborators 
with communist security services to hold a wide range of elected and appointed state and 
civil service positions for a period of five years until January 30, 1996. This was later 
extended by parliament to the year 2000, a measure that required the override of a veto by 
President Vaclav Havel.177 The Lustration Law from 1991 was aimed specifically at 
those whose names appeared in the files of the Czechoslovak communist secret police as 
well as those, who were registered as potential candidates for collaboration. However, 
this latter provision was unclear, and in 1992 the Constitutional Court declared it illegal 
while upholding all other provisions.178 
According to this law, former Communist officials and collaborators with the 
secret police were banned from holding positions in: 
- the state administration at both federal and republican levels 
- the Czechoslovakian army (the rank of colonel and higher) 
- the federal security and information service 
-  the federal intelligence agency 
- the federal police 
-  the office of the president 
-  offices of the federal assembly 
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-  offices of the Czech National Council 
-  offices of the Slovak National Council 
-  offices of the federal, Czech, and Slovak governments; offices of the federal 
and republican constitutional courts 
-  the offices of the federal republican supreme courts 
-  the presidium of the Czechoslovakian Academy of Sciences 
- Czechoslovak, Czech, and Slovak radio and television and the 
Czechoslovakian Press Agency 
- top management in enterprises and banks owned by the state 
-  top academic at colleges and universities 
- offices of judges and prosecutors.179 
After the breakup of Czechoslovakia on January 1, 1993, the process of lustration 
was continued in the newly created Czech Republic under exactly the same law, 
screening by August 1993 more than 200,000 people. In July 1993, the Czech parliament 
passed the “Law on the Legitimacy of and Resistance to the Communist Regime.” It 
stated that the former communist party was an illegitimate and criminal organization and 
honored those people who fought the Communist Party in the name of democratic, moral, 
and religious values. This law was later upheld by the Czech Constitutional Court.180 
What is more, an office for documentation and prosecution of communist crimes was 
formed. One year later, a law concerning the opening of secret-police files by victims was 
passed. However, the process of making the files accessible is slow, and only about 
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30,000 of 100,000 applications have been reviewed to date, from which only about 4,000 
positively and have been allowed to see them.181 
After the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, the lustration law was adopted by the 
newly created Republic of Slovakia; but the Slovakian government later opposed 
lustration and in January 1994 appealed to the Constitutional Court to overturn it. Though 
the court rejected the petition, the lustration law was never invoked, and remained 
inactive until it expired at the end of 1996. Every government announced that the 
problem of lustration would not be taken into discussion. Since 2004, the Slovakian 
Institute of the Remembrance of the Nation has been publishing on its website the names 
of secret-service collaborators; nevertheless, this exposure is not followed by any 
sanctions against those named.182 
The process of lustration in Czechoslovakia, and after its dissolution, in the Czech 
Republic, was controversial from the beginning. Supporters claimed that it had to be done 
lest communist crimes and abuses go unpunished. They also maintained that even limited 
justice was better then none. Opponents decried this law as dangerously presuming guilt, 
denying citizens due process of law, and damaging the country’s image abroad. Even 
President Vaclav Havel, a former dissident, felt that the lustration law was an 
“incomprehensible expression of distrust in Czech ability to form a normal legal order 
and could only cast doubt at home and abroad on Czech capacity to be a fully fledged 
member of the family of democratic states.”183 The international community criticized 
the law, stating that it discriminated in employment and violated human-rights standards; 
specifically, that it assigned collective guilt by prosecuting individuals solely on the basis 
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of membership or affiliation.184 For the Czech Republic, which at that time was pursuing 
NATO and European Union membership, there was a point, which could have been 
easily dismissed, that even the United States Congress had criticized the law, calling it a 
"human-rights problem" in one of its reports.185  
Czech lustration was based on the classified files of the secret police, which had 
not been checked—so that if a name even appeared on the lists, the individual could be 
named as a collaborator. About 10,000 people were so identified, nobody asking them 
whether they were guilty or had ever collaborated with the secret police.186 What is more, 
people very often fell under suspicion by having refused to collaborate. Merely the 
attempt to recruit those people had left visible tracks in the files, which were 
misunderstood later as collaboration.187  
Individuals could appeal lustration decisions, and most of those who appealed 
cleared their names. They could also sue the interior ministry for slander. The ministry 
lost a huge majority of civil cases as courts demanded more evidence than the simple 
appearance of a name in a reconstructed list.188 Another pointed weakness of lustration 
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criminal organization. As a result, a criminal organization was treated as a legitimate 
component in the Czech legal code, becoming a tool of revenge, not just part of coming 
to terms with the past.189 
Lustration in Czechoslovakia and, after 1993, in the Czech Republic, is not 
generally seen as similar to that pursued in other countries, which were usually trying to 
find political justice through criminal trials in the courts. The Czech way was not a 
revenge seeking, but a defense instrument for the fragile new democracy.190 It was not 
meant to serve justice or to criminalize activities that were legal at the time. The 
elimination from public life of former communists was rather to prevent a reprise of 
February 1948, when communists used a governmental crisis to seize power through a 
coup,191 and to protect the new democracy from the former regime. However, the authors 
of the lustration law did not support their claims of real threat from the old regime by any 
comprehensive and convincing brief, thus giving another argument against lustration into 
the hands of their opponents.192  
Lustration helped the Czechs to come to terms with the past. Having introduced 
the law to preserve the new democracy from alleged dangers from persistent communists, 
the authors did not want to be charged with retroactivity. They turned the process over to 
the bureaucracy, removing it from discussion in public settings such as the parliament 
and helping inhibit discussion of the past in general— leaving the last two decades of 
communist rule in Czechoslovakia unexplored in academic and popular history.193 What 
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is more, the lustration law forestalled a process of wild lustration. Before the law was 
passed, there were many public accusations of collaboration with the communist secret 
police. The law replaced this policy with a confidential, bureaucratic process and 
instruments of appeal, significantly decreasing the number of denunciations. As a result, 
the lustration law decreased the political capital of denunciation, making the profitability 
of forging accusations much lower.194 In addition, lustration brought into power new 
elites without ties to the past. The great majority of these elites could undergo lustration 
with no problem, so this change in the composition of the political and economy spheres 
seemed natural and obvious. Those who were lustrated positively were transferred to 
other, non-lustratable positions rather than dismissed, suggesting that lustration was not a 
ruthless process depriving people of their jobs.195 It must be noted that although 
lustration was intended to protect national institutions from infiltration by the former 
communist nomenklatura, it neglected to impose lustration on the president, ministers, 
and members of parliament—while the lowly clerks working for them had to undergo the 
whole process to make sure that they did not pose a threat to the new democracy in its 
phase of consolidation.196 
C. COMPARISION WITH THE CASE OF POLAND 
In regime change, old elites are replaced by new. If not, the old elite may still 
shape many aspects of national life. Breaking ties with the past demands breaking with 
the former holders of power. Lustration, decommunization, and denazification are 
examples of measures taken to achieve a fresh start. Lustration and decommunization 
have been essential instruments of peaceable elite change and their removal from 
Czechoslovakian and to some extend Polish state administration and public life and 
liquidating of their connections and ties. After WWII in Germany, the same function was 
handled by denazification. The aims of these processes are similar: to prevent the 
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functionaries of old regimes from remaining in public service, whether in state education, 
the judiciary, law enforcement, parliamentary representation of the people, the holding of 
ministerial positions, or the shaping of public opinion via the media.  
In Czechoslovakia and Germany, legislation concerning the past embraced both 
functionaries and collaborators with the secret services, as well as the members of the 
nomenklatura—significantly different from the case in Poland. Poland’s lustration act 
bans secret collaborators from holding important positions in various spheres, but only if 
they conceal their collaboration and are subsequently found guilty by the courts. If they 
admit working for the communist secret services, there is no punishment meted. 
Moreover, Polish lustration concerns only workers and collaborators with the communist 
services. It says nothing about members of the party apparatus and nomenklatura. Thus 
decommunization, by definition, has not been conducted in Poland. After 1989, the Post-
Communist Party won parliamentary elections twice and former high-ranking party 
members held the most important positions in the state (including the presidency, by 
former communist minister Aleksander Kwasniewski, the prime ministry, parliamentary 
speakers, and many other key positions in the executive, legislative, and judicial 
branches). In this way, Poland differs from Germany and Czechoslovakia, where top 
leaders and regime apparatus were excluded from public life, and even, as in Germany, 
convicted for the crimes they committed during their reign.  
An important difference between post-communist Poland and post-Nazi Germany 
is that Polish regime change was evolutionary, whereas in post-Nazi Germany the 
transition was sudden, the regime abruptly ending to due to defeat in war. As a 
consequence of Poland’s gradual emergence from totalitarianism, the border between 
communism and democracy was blurred, and so was responsibility for the bad things that 
happened in communist Poland—unlike the case in Germany, where people bore direct 
responsibility for the deeds of Nazism after the war.197 Many hold that decommunization 
in Poland is necessary to improve the quality of Polish democracy, as was denazification 
in post-war Germany, which served as the basis for rebuilding and retaining democracy 
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in the Federal Republic of Germany. In Germany after the war, the new law was imposed 
from the beginning, and nobody was interested in improving Nazi laws instead. Rather, 
Nazi laws were considered illegal, having been created and adopted by criminals. The 
new laws imposed were not created by prominent Nazis, but by those who did not 
participate significantly in Nazi crimes. By contrast, the complaint is made in Poland that 
a huge number of communist regulations and laws remain on the books and are not being 
reviewed fast enough. Moreover, new laws are enacted by parliaments that consist 
sometimes of a majority of communist party members and leaders. Decommunization, 
like denazification, it is claimed, protects nascent democracies from the influence of 
former anti-democratic regimes. 
 The opponents of decommunization in Poland maintain that the push to clean 
house is not for justice’ sake, as in Germany, but for revenge, after almost twenty years. 
According to them, decommunization is a manipulation that leads to collective 
culpability for violating human rights. However, supporters claim that “not dealing with 
the past is a silent acceptance of the fact that justice and truth- foundations of our 
civilization-become empty slogans. That is why the example of denazification of Nazi 
Germany can be a model of European way of solving problems while abolishing the 
totalitarian system.”198 
Though Poland and Czechoslovakia have similar legacies of communism, their 
cases are quite different. The Czechs, then the Slovaks, chose a frankly retributive model 
of dealing with the past, while the Polish model was semi-reconciliatory.199 These 
countries’ dealings with the past were driven by their different political circumstances in 
the transition to democracy. Poland was the first to overthrow communism, but she was 
one of the last to adopt some form of law concerning the past. The reason lies in her 
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negotiated transition, which allowed former communist party nomenklatura to remain on 
the political scene and efficiently block legislation on the matter. By contrast, 
Czechoslovakia’s velvet revolution was not a result of negotiations won at the expense of 
concessions to the communist regime, but the result of regime’s resignation in the face of 
a wave of regime changes in Eastern Europe. Thus Czechoslovakia’s lustration law was 
one of the first to be unrestrained by former communists. The case of Germany is similar, 
wherein denazification laws were introduced immediately, with the support of the 
winning allies and without the participation of Nazi high officials.200 In Poland, however, 
there was ample time to diffuse any concentration on the past and give the powers 
opposed to a reckoning both the opportunity to neutralize it and to influence legislation. 
As a result, Poland still does not have a decommunization law and its lustration law has 
complex procedures and mild sanctions, especially for people owning up to their 
complicity;201 whereas in Germany and Czechoslovakia, disqualification was imposed 
successfully. 
In Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Germany, there was awareness that recomposition 
of the elite is key to regime transformation. An incompetent, corrupt, totalitarian machine 
can obstruct democratic change, and therefore pivotal democratic positions should not be 
held by "citizens previously involved in activities of the organs and organizations, which 
consciously suppressed democracy and human rights."202 Though it can recomposition 
was accomplished in Germany and Czechoslovakia, in Poland it was not. It is widely 
believed, especially on the Polish right, that a network of former communist activists and 
secret agents are broadly spread in state administration and business, conducting 
numerous illegal activities  and disturbing the process of democratic and economic 
reform in Poland.203 
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In Czechoslovakian lustration, a positive lustration bars a person from holding a 
position in a democratic regime, which means his disqualification; while in Poland, the 
aim is to prove the truthfulness of an affidavit submitted by a candidate for office. This 
means that persons collaborating with the communist regime are not disqualified from 
public life if they make a true statement regarding their past and their ties with the secret 
police. Their affidavit can be condemned publicly and they can be forced by public 
pressure to resign from an office or candidacy. Nevertheless, there is no law banning 
them outright if their affidavit is true, regardless of content—unlike in Czechoslovakia, 
where “the threat to democracy is reduced by removing some members of the totalitarian 
machinery from leading positions. In Poland, a revelation of past collaboration is 
officially published that gives the public an opportunity to control the steps taken by 
these officials, while a false affidavit leads to their removal from public office.”204 
Evaluating the efficacy of laws pertaining to the past in Poland, Czechoslovakia, 
and Germany, it can be said that good results in neutralizing the influence of old regimes 
on the new democratic order were obtained by inacting condign processes in the latter 
two countries. In Poland, because of lack of decommunization, the influence of the old 
elites is clearly visible even in the highest levels of state administration. Although 
implemention of a lustration law in 1997 (revised in 2006) helped mitigate old influences, 
the examples of Germany and Czechoslovakia—who dealt firmly with the past during 
their transition to democracy, market economics, and governmental reform—suggest that 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
The Roundtable Talks are of utmost importance in the history of Poland. Their 
very name symbolically affirmed the parity of two opposed camps and the exercise of 
goodwill in crafting compromise. These unprecedented negotiations between the 
communist apparat and the workers launched the transformation of Poland’s political and 
economic order, and the reforms that came out of them were foundational to the 
restoration of democracy in the land. The accords were achieved in a civil, unbloody 
manner, a remarkable achievement for an opposition that had known ruthless 
suppression—the last time barely eight years before—by an entrenched power structure 
determined to preserve itself and willing to use force. Whatever the opinions and 
judgments heard in Poland today, the vital importance of the Roundtable Talks in 
precipitating the breakup of Polish communism cannot be denied. The peaceful 
revolution launched by the Roundtable Talks enabled a pacific transfer of power and 
evolutionary reforms (though some remnants of communism persist today). In 1989, 
Poland again became a democracy—without violent upheaval as in Romania—and thus 
launched a wave of liberty that shook all Eastern Europe and resulted in the collapse of 
the Berlin Wall, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and the end of more than forty 
years of communist rule in this part of the world. 
However, despite the events of 1989 and their many positive fruits, Poland is still 
vexed with problems inherited from the communist regime. The issues of lustration and 
decommunization are returning to the political agenda, with both supporters and fierce 
opponents. The latter, mainly from the political left, argue that the past should not be an 
issue anymore and that lustration and decommunization are really intended as weapons in 
political clashes between parties. The former, supporters of unrestricted access to secret-
police archives, maintain that lustration and decommunization would be priceless tools in 
uprooting the ill effects of communism still suffered after almost twenty years. They 
believe that decommunization would clean up the political scene, taking out those 
directly and prominently involved in the regime, whose deeds make them responsible in 
part for the pathologies of the communist legacy.  
 68
There is broad discussion in Poland as to the manner in which decommunization 
and lustration should be conducted (if at all) and how to treat people who worked with 
the regime. On one hand, it is believed that persecuted individuals have the moral 
privilege of knowing who was informing on them; on the other hand, it is generally 
agreed that such revelation should not be made publicly, in the flash of cameras, because 
the reasons people collaborated vary significantly. Some did so just to advance their 
career or make extra money; but there are those who collaborated under threat of 
blackmail or feared for their lives, or their families’ lives. What serves as everyday 
fodder for another sensational news story can be in reality a personal tragedy if only the 
fact of cooperation is revealed, not the motives and circumstances. Such a sensitive issue 
must be handled circumspectly to prevent abuse by revenge seekers who might be eager 
to deny their old persecutors a fair trial and the right of defense. Lustration must not be 
capable of use as a clout when political power is threatened or wielded to gain sympathy 
and silence opposition. Moreover, accusations of collaboration must be handled carefully 
and skeptically, since secret-police archives are believed incomplete and in some parts 
forged. “While revolutions seek to break with the past by identifying and punishing 
members of the old regime, and by excluding its beneficiaries and minor functionaries 
from full participation in the new system, transitions discourage retroactive punishment 
for complicity with the old order. Acknowledging that most people living under an 
authoritarian regime are in some ways ‘complicit’ with it (for their livelihood, 
advancement of life chances, or simply out of fear), transitional procedures relegate 
punishment of crimes to courts of law, with legal action limited to acts in violation of 
statutes in force at that time. Prosecution or discrimination under ‘lustration’ or 
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